OSPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, 2.0. 2C520

leat
FSSA Sah ae
ena
; 3 f2/7 ;
" ptember 20,

Cooies to: . Gi 2

a THE WHITE HOUSE ae

ee
Subject: Mao Worries Over Sino-U stions
pa Ch Ap
Attached for your information is an INR
analysis of a report on Chairman Mao's views of
Sino-US Relations.
, ey
Lee
aw, ao YZ. aoe a
Thomas BY Pickering
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
INR Analysis
RGUS~2
Declass: impo
1 4, a

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GENEMAL BRENT SCOWCROF /

OS 22 erence

(tisahlerne ce iby

a

ann enacnnctceerteemmamneatars «seb mbar
srenemsnctee monet

Mas Worries Over Sino-US. petaticns:

We are sure of virtually nothing when it comes £°

the alignment of PRC leaders on foreign policy issues

such clandestine reporting as we get is generally aacnae
unreliable or unilluminating. Because of this dearth we
call to your attention an ambiguous but well-sourced

report of recent Mao comments on Sino~US relations, and
append some more than usually TEES HSE LANG speculation.

The report has it that Mao criticized a Ministry
of Foreign Affairs document on Sino-US relations, noting ~
that a "good case” had been made for "ending the struggle"
against the US, but adding that the "new relationship
was turning sour" during the slow process of normalizing
relations. Charging that the "major issue" had been
ignored, ‘Mao warned that “internal squabbling" could
result unless a tendency to be pEegscupred’ with daily
trivia were overcome.

The report makes it reasonably clear that Mao:

-- wished to pel tevdte his approval of the policy
of Sino-US detente;

~= emphasized that too gradual a pace in improving
relations would be deleterious to PRC interests;

-~ wanted ways to be found to speed the pace; and

~~ was directing his criticism against Chinese rather
than US implementation of detente, although the
"turning sour" phrase could imply that he thought
US implementation hes in its turn Jeen adversely

affected. . = AGRO: inl

“

‘ : —

SECRET/NO FORE ‘TON DISSEM , XGDS-2

ee

vn ie a

- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT
TO BE INCLUDED IN. ANY" OTHER DOCUMENT OR
PUBLICATION

ee Dh oes

Mao's criticism was discussed by senior Ministry
of Foreign Affairs officials, apparently at the mid-
July meetings attended by Huang Chen of the PRC's
Washington liaison office and other ranking Chinese
officials involved with Sino-American relations. Given
that timing, the meetings probably considered the results
of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks and agreements, their impact
on the US-USSR-PRC relationship, the next steps in
US-PRC relations, and the foreign policy report to be
. presented to the Tenth Party Corigress.}

Reasoning from this context, it is.a plausible
inference that Mao was profoundly disturbed by the impli-
cations of the Nixon~-Brezhnev agreements. A genuine
‘Soviet-US detente, casting doubt on Washington's readi-
ness to exert diplomatic and moral pressure against Moscow

on behalf of a threatened Peking, could call into question

the Mao-Chou reading of international strategic relation-

. Ships and expose them to the charge that their foreign
policy had unwisely placed all-of Peking's.eggs in

‘Washington's basket. : am

If in these circumstances Mao faced sentiment among —
the Party ideologues or the military favoring a move
toward the Soviet Union, it would be in. his character to
respond that the Nixon-Brezhnev accomplishments indicated
not that the PRC's pro-US policy was faulty but that it
had been ineffectually implemented. “Internal squabbling"
.on the subject might also account for CHou En-lai's
defensively-worded assurance at the Tenth Party Congress
that Soviet-US "contention is absolute and protracted,
.whereas collusion is relative and temporary."

The Congress seems to have consolidated Chou's
position in some degree. This, and the Russians' August
resumption at their Crimea conference and elsewhere of
their anti-Chinese diatribes make it even more likely |
than usual that Mao will have his way if he now wishes - °
aoe to pursue improved Sino-US relations more vigor~
ously. ;

Drafted: INR/REA: DiKeyser,RLWilliams/tr
x-20616: 9/17/73 a ‘
. SECRET/NO FORGIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RIM WRCOCTHHRY ANDAR Seer Om orate em mae eet lot lee

i